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I. Introduction
Over the past two decades, the United States and China have become increasingly competitive on various levels, economically as well as militarily. Comments and overtures by officials and analysts of both countries indicate the possibility of a future military confrontation between these nation-states, most likely involving the question of Taiwan sovereignty. It is reasonable to assume that the Americans and the Chinese have each developed operational plans to address any contingency in the Taiwan theatre.
Essential to the successful development of any operational plan is a thorough knowledge of one's opponent, especially regarding their application of operational art. Surprise serves as one of the principles of operational art for American and Chinese armed forces alike. Deception is a key element of surprise. An understanding of an enemy's concept of operational deception provides the combatant commander valuable insight which enables him to anticipate and counter deception plans initiated against his forces.
Certain principles have been attributed to deception, such as security, plausibility, and coordination. Yet, unlike the principles of war, which differ to varying degrees among the nations of the world, the principles of deception appear to have been articulated assuming universal applicability. An inaccurate assumption that the enemy's principles of operational deception match those of the United States could blind the combatant commander to deceptive maneuvers and lead to disastrous missteps. Twentieth century history and recent studies of military strategy indicate that Chinese leaders place significant value on surprise, and are willing and capable of using deception to achieve
it.
1 This study will analyze Chinese principles of operational deception in relation to those of the United States in order to shed light on the potential use of operational deception against American forces in the event of a conflict in the Taiwan Strait.
Specifically, it will determine whether the Chinese principles of operational deception match those of the United States.
The data necessary to make this determination will be collected through a study of This study discovered that the use of unconventional action might also be a standard Chinese principle of operational deception. Unconventional actions, as previously mentioned, were taken to maintain the extent of China's deployment into the Korea a secret. The Chinese also took unconventional action in its deceptive maneuvers at the onset of the Sino-Soviet conflict, sending troops in advance of a follow-on force to bury themselves in foxholes on the contested island of Damansky/Zhenbao. These troops allegedly fired upon a Soviet Officer-in-Charge and his soldiers the next day as they harmlessly stood in defiance of the arrival of the follow-on Chinese force, which also used deceit to initiate deadly hostilities. , 1946 -1950 (Stanford: Stanford University Press: 2003 minimal. The Chinese military has also experienced a significant modernization since This crisis provides valuable insight into the ways China might approach a future military confrontation in the Taiwan Strait. The Chinese took note of America's resolve and its ability to quickly intervene and limit China's military options. One of the lessons learned is quite clear: if the Chinese ever intend to seize the island of Taiwan, they must attack swiftly, before America can respond adequately. Or, they must employ assets that will cripple the ability of the United States military to respond. Both actions highlight the need for operational deception. The former requires deception that masks intention. The latter necessitates deception that conceals capability. How these aims might be achieved is of significant consequence to the combatant commander, and must be understood from a Chinese perspective.
America has traditionally downplayed the merits of surprise and deception, to its detriment.
17 China, on the other hand, holds surprise and deception in high esteem. They recognize the value of deception as a force multiplier, and, therefore, expect to incorporate it into most, if not all, of their operations. 18 Their coordination and preparations in support of their deception plans should be expected to be detailed and complete, and protected by a high degree of operational security. While this may appear similar to how Americans would describe their deception efforts, Chinese belief in the importance and potential success of these plans appears to be significantly greater than that held by Americans. Increasing the significance China places on deception in a conflict with the United States is the power imbalance that exists between the two militaries, which encourages the Chinese to use deception as a force multiplier to close the power gap. Therefore, combatant commanders should expect China to make full use 17 Ibid., Vego, 60. 18 Office China's second option to conceal its intentions -incapacitating surveillance equipment -requires the use of unconventional action. By means of space-or land-based weaponry, through the use of computer viruses, or by employment of deceptive indicators, the PRC could incapacitate select American satellites or computers long enough to blind their surveillance systems to Chinese force mobilization. The source of the attack would be masked until after its knowledge became inconsequential. While this course of action may seem far-fetched to many Americans, one should note that the Chinese are pursuing unconventional ideas and technology that lead to asymmetrical advantages, that they have resorted to unconventional action to achieve their aims of deception and surprise, and that they have identified America's space and computer systems as critical vulnerabilities. 19 An attack on these systems is a viable option which
should not be underestimated. 20 Greater effort should be made to defend against these tactics, and more thought should be given to contingency plans that could provide for sustained operations and rapid recovery from such an attack.
Recognizing that their attempts to conceal their intentions in the Taiwan Strait might be unsuccessful, the Chinese would simultaneously pursue another element of operational deception: concealing their capabilities. In particular, they would attempt to hide their ability to paralyze the American forces that are expected to enter the region to defend Taiwan. Over the past ten years, the Chinese have placed emphasis on the development of weapons that could stun and cripple an unsuspecting, powerful opponent.
This type of weapon, otherwise known as Assassin's Mace or shashoujian, has garnered a lot of attention in American military circles. 21 Much speculation has been made about what this weaponry might constitute. Network viruses, new types of mines, lasers that destroy satellites, tsunami generators, and plasma weapons illustrate the possible nature of these weapons, the very type that could make the unthinkable attack on American surveillance systems a reality. Whatever these weapons may be, the Chinese appear intent on their development. 22 The nature of these weapons and their existence are likely to remain secret until they are employed. Thus, their enemies will be less likely to create an appropriate defense to counter them, and the shock effect produced by their capabilities will be maintained. Unfurled and employed against American forces as they attempt to intervene in the Taiwan Strait, these weapons could quickly upset the power dynamics between the two militaries and allow the Chinese to initiate and complete their operations to seize Taiwan before the American military could recover. It is incumbent upon combatant commanders to recognize these potential threats facing American forcesespecially naval forces -entering the region, and to seek the intelligence and defense capabilities necessary to anticipate and counter these threats.
In any Taiwan Strait scenario, the Chinese will attempt to reduce the impact of American intervention by disguising the timing of their attack. Initiating an offensive when least expected, the PRC would, at least momentarily, gain the upper hand and press forward to seize whatever ground they could before American forces would begin to hinder their advance. Combatant commanders and their staffs should consider China's opportunities to employ strategic timing to exploit strategic dynamics to catch Taiwan's defenders unawares. By maintaining a vigilant posture, staying attuned to intelligence, and expecting the unexpected, combatant commanders can reduce the likelihood of being surprised by the timing of China's initiation of hostilities.
In summary, if the Chinese were to go on the offensive against Taiwan, the combatant commander responsible for the region could expect China to deceptively employ its forces for exercises somewhere along the East China Sea in preparation for an assault. A missile attack to soften Taiwanese defenses would commence at an unexpected moment. This barrage might be preceded by an attack on American surveillance and communication systems. In the meantime, Chinese forces would reposition for a followon amphibious assault. American naval forces arriving on the scene prior to the surrender of Taiwan could encounter a set of unconventional weapons that paralyzes them long enough to prevent their intervention in the conflict. By the time these forces recovered, they could be faced with the task of liberating rather than defending Taiwan, something the American people may not consider worth the blood of their sons and daughters.
Although the Chinese place greater value on surprise and employ some different deception tactics than Americans, it is important to remember that the principles of operational deception remain the same between the two nations. This means that China will take time to coordinate and prepare their deception plans using a centralized command and control under tight operational security. They will instigate intelligence mechanisms to feed deceptive information to their enemy. And they will take the time to confirm that this information is having the desired effect on their opponent's thinking.
This presents several opportunities for American assets to target, discover, and exploit information, which, if taken advantage of, would provide combatant commanders with the intelligence and the tools they need to see past the guises they are presented by the Chinese. This requires a robust intelligence-gathering mechanism. Military leaders should aggressively seek the development and improvement of this mechanism. At the same time, they should carefully consider the potential operational deception plans that could be devised and employed against American forces from a Chinese perspective, and consider how American operational plans for a Taiwan Strait scenario take into account these ploys and the possibility that some of them may even be successful. The combatant commander who is able to do this will be well-suited to respond to any eventuality and capable of turning would-be disaster into victory.
IV. Conclusions
China's principles of operational deception merited a review to determine whether the assumption that their principles match those of the United States is correct. The study Leaders with responsibilities that include China in their Area of Responsibility should review their contingency plans with respect to China to ensure Sino operational deception has been correctly factored into these plans. An in-depth study of Chinese methods of employing operational deception should be conducted in order to provide additional insight to these reviews. Likewise, combatant commanders should enhance their ability to defeat Chinese operational deception plans by studying the application of counter-deception and reading available literature on current Chinese military thinking.
